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Abstract
Strategic investors, such as corporate venture capitalists, engage in the financing of
start–up firms to complement their core businesses and to facilitate the internalization
of externalities. We argue that while strategic objectives make it more worthwhile for an
investor to elicit high entrepreneurial effort, they can also undermine his commitment
to penalize poorly performing entrepreneurs by terminating their projects. Based on
this tradeoff we develop a theory of financing choice between strategic and financial
investors. Our framework provides insights into the design of corporate venturing deals
and the choice between corporate venturing and independent venture capital finance.
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1 Introduction
Financiers often benefit from the success of the projects they finance not only because of
direct financial returns, but also because of synergies with their existing lines of business
or investment portfolios. Consider the example of corporate venturing where a corporation
provides financing to a downstream start–up firm in attempt to spur demand for its own
products. In this case, the success of the start–up firm entails a positive externality on the
corporation’s core business. A related example is vendor financing where a supplier extends a
loan to a customer to finance the purchase of products. In this situation, the vendor financier
may benefit from the customer’s success not only because it makes it more likely that the
loan will be repaid but also because of the possibility of repeat business. We refer to such
externalities as strategic benefits. What is the role of strategic benefit objectives in financial
contracting? How do they affect entrepreneurial incentives and project performance? And
how do they shape the choice between strategic and financial investors? The aim of this
paper is to develop a theoretical framework that provides answers to these questions.
The starting point of our theory comes from the management literature. Practitioners
frequently express concerns that corporations are less disciplined than purely financial in-
vestors in abandoning their investments and terminating poorly performing projects. For
example, Brody and Ehrlich (1998, p. 53), in an article on corporate venturing published in
the McKinsey Quarterly, write:
“... VC [venture capital] firms manage their portfolios ruthlessly, weeding out
likely losers early. [...] Abandoning ventures in this way has never been easy
for large corporations, whose projects are often underpinned by personal relation-
ships, political concerns, and vague strategic objectives.”1
The idea that strategic objectives may threaten an investor’s financial discipline is central
1Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (1998, p. 10) remark: “Independent venture capitalists often stop funding
for failing firms because they want to devote their limited energy to firms with the greatest promise. Corporate
venture capitalists have been frequently unwilling to write off unsuccessful ventures, [...].” And Siegel et
al. (1988, p. 234) write: “Strategic benefit objectives are not necessarily ill advised so long as they do not
interfere with sound financial decision making. When they do, the corporate venture capital process is likely
to become less effective. [...] Investments that appear exciting from a corporate perspective [...] but are not
financially attractive may well drain resources rather than produce opportunities.”
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to our theory. Specifically, we argue that while strategic objectives make it more worthwhile
for an investor to elicit high entrepreneurial effort, they can also undermine his commitment
to penalize managerial slack by terminating the entrepreneur’s project. The investor faces a
credibility problem: although he would like to commit to penalize shirking, the fact that he
would lose the strategic benefit upon terminating the project means that it may not be in his
interest to do so. Anticipating the investor’s lack of commitment to exercise the termination
threat, the entrepreneur may be less inclined to work hard, and suboptimal performance
may result. This “soft budget constraint” problem must be traded off against the strategic
investor’s potential willingness to finance the project at lower cost than an independent,
purely financial investor. The mere fact that the strategic investor internalizes the positive
externality and appropriates the strategic benefit may allow him to break even at a lower
rate of interest than an independent investor. This, in turn, may have positive implications
for the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort.
Which effect dominates depends on the size of the strategic benefit. As long as the
strategic benefit is sufficiently small, the threat of termination is still credible under strate-
gic investor financing (provided it is credible in the absence of strategic benefits). In this
case, strategic investor financing dominates financing by an independent investor, as it facili-
tates the internalization of the strategic externality. As the strategic benefit becomes larger,
however, the threat of termination eventually loses its credibility under strategic investor
financing, while it is credible under independent investor financing. In this situation, in-
dependent investor financing dominates strategic investor financing for intermediate values
of the strategic benefit, while the opposite is true if the strategic benefit is “very” large.
In the latter case, it becomes an overriding concern to facilitate the internalization of the
externality by having a strategic investor finance the project, even though an independent
investor would be a “tougher” financier.
We develop several extensions of the base model. One extension concerns the possibility
of deal syndication where the entrepreneur is financed by both the strategic and an inde-
pendent investor. Much in spirit of the literature on multiple lenders (e.g., Dewatripont
and Tirole 1994, Repullo and Suarez 1998), we show that syndicated financing enhances
the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort and improves project outcomes. Intuitively, hav-
ing an independent investor contribute to the financing of the project allows to reduce the
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strategic investor’s financial stake in the project, which in turn enhances the credibility of
the termination threat imposed by him. At the same time, having the strategic investor on
board facilitates the internalization of the strategic externality. In other words, corporate
and independent venture capital may actually be complements, rather than substitutes.
We are not first to investigate the effect of strategic benefits on financing choices and
project outcomes. Hellmann (2002) presents a model of financing choice between strategic
and financial investors where project success relies on the financier’s support. He shows that
positive externalities make financing by a strategic financier more advantageous, while the
opposite is true for the case of negative externalities. The reason for the latter result is
that negative externalities make it more costly to provide the financier with an incentive to
provide support. Riyanto and Schwienbacher (2006) analyze the strategic use of corporate
venture financing to influence product market competition. Taking a different perspective,
Bettignies and Chemla (2007) explore the impact of corporate venturing on managerial
incentive contracts and the corporation’s position in the managerial labor market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section presents the base
model. Section 3 analyzes the choice between strategic and independent investor financing.
Section 4 provides several extensions and robustness checks. Section 5 contains a discussion
of the model’s empirical implications, and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a setting with universal risk–neutrality and no discounting. There are four points
in time, t = 0, 1, 2, 3. At date 0, an entrepreneur has the opportunity to undertake a project
at cost I > 0. The entrepreneur has personal wealth w < I; she thus requires external
funding I − w. At date 1, the entrepreneur can exert non–contractible effort e ∈ [0, 1] at
private cost ψ(e) = βe2/2, where β > 0 is sufficiently large as to ensure interior solutions.
Effort will enhance the probability of project success, as specified below. At date 2, the
project is either continued or irreversibly terminated (to be explained in more detail below).
Assets in place have a liquidation value L < I at date 2 and zero at date 3. At date 3, if
the project is continued, final and verifiable cash flows realized. Cash flows are Π > 0 with
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probability e and zero with probability 1− e. We assume
max
e
{eΠ− ψ(e)} > I (1)
In other words, conditional on the entrepreneur exerting project value maximizing effort, the
net present value of the project is positive.
While effort is non–contractible, it is assumed to be privately observable to the en-
trepreneur’s financier (e.g., by virtue of the financier’s close relationship with the en-
trepreneur). Non–contractibility of effort gives rise to a standard moral hazard problem.
Observability of effort has the advantage that the financier can potentially sharpen the en-
trepreneur’s incentive to exert effort by threatening to terminate her project should she
underprovide effort. To allow for this possibility, we consider financial contracts under which
the financier is pledged the right to terminate the project at date 2. As is standard, the
entrepreneur is protected by limited liability. A financial contract in our setup then consists
of payments (R,R0), where R ≤ Π is the payment to the financier in the event of project
success,2 and R0 ≤ L is the financier’s share of the liquidation proceeds in the event of
project termination.
There are two types of financiers in our setup: a “strategic” investor and “independent”
investors. The strategic investor differs from an independent investor in that he is endowed
with an asset (or portfolio of assets) whose value will be enhanced if the project turns
out to be successful. In other words, project success entails a positive externality on the
strategic investor. For example, the strategic investor could be a corporation whose core
business would benefit from the entrepreneur’s project, if successful. We can also think of
the strategic investor as a financial intermediary (e.g., a venture capitalist) holding a portfolio
of financial securities (e.g., equity stakes) in complementary projects. Formally, we assume
that the strategic investor enjoys a strategic benefit ∆ > 0 in the event of project success
(regardless of whether the project is financed by him or by an independent investor3).
For the moment, we restrict attention to the case of single investor financing, i.e., we
assume that the entrepreneur is financed either by the strategic or an independent investor
(if at all), but not by both. The case of syndicated financing where the entrepreneur is
financed by more than one investor will be considered in Subsection 4.4. Throughout the
2By limited liability, the payment in the event of project failure is zero.
3This assumption will be relaxed in Subsection 4.2.
4
date 0 date 1 date 2 date 3
financing choice
↓
invest I > 0
effort choice financier observes e
↓
financier continues
or terminates project
cash flows
realize
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
paper, we assume that financial markets are perfectly competitive in that the entrepreneur
makes take–it–or–leave–it contract offers to financiers, including the strategic investor.4
The game at hand can now be summarized as follows (see Figure 1):
• At date 0, the entrepreneur chooses between strategic and independent investor financ-
ing, a financial contract is signed, and investment is made.
• At date 1, the entrepreneur exerts non–contractible effort.
• At date 2, the entrepreneur’s financier, after having observed the effort choice, decides
whether to continue or irrevocably terminate the project.
• At date 3, final and verifiable cash flows realize (if project continued).
Finally, we assume that parties can commit to not renegotiate the contract in place. We
will discuss later the robustness of our analysis to the possibility of renegotiation.
3 Strategic versus Independent Investor Financing
In this section, we analyze the choice between strategic and independent investor financ-
ing. Subsection 3.1 derives the optimal contracts under strategic and independent investor
financing, respectively. Subsection 3.2 characterizes the optimal financing choice.
3.1 Optimal Contracts
We start with the case of strategic investor financing, taking the outcome under independent
investor financing as given. We subsequently derive the outcome under independent investor
financing. Suppose the entrepreneur seeks to be financed by the strategic investor, and
4Subsection 4.3 briefly discusses the case where the strategic investor has the full bargaining power.
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let eout denote the effort level that the entrepreneur would exert if the strategic investor
turned down her contract offer (in which case the entrepreneur would seek financing from
an independent investor). Since the entrepreneur makes take–it–or–leave–it contract offers,
an optimal financial contract between the strategic investor and the entrepreneur solves
max
(e∈[0,1],R≤Π,R0≤L)
e(Π−R)− ψ(e) (2)
s.t.
e(R+∆) ≥ R0 (CO)
e(R+∆) = I − w + eout∆ (IR)
e is incentive–compatible (IC)
where (2) is the entrepreneur’s payoff, and e denotes the (candidate) equilibrium effort level.
The continuation incentive constraint (CO) guarantees that the strategic investor has no
incentive to terminate the project in equilibrium (which must be the case, since L < I). The
left hand side is the strategic investor’s payoff from project continuation, and the right hand
side is his payoff from irreversibly terminating the project and seizing liquidation proceedsR0
(but losing the strategic benefit). The break–even constraint (IR) ensures that the strategic
investor makes zero profits. The left hand side is his payoff from accepting the contract,
and the right hand side is his payoff from rejecting. The incentive–compatibility constraint,
which is yet to be derived, ensures that the entrepreneur finds it privately optimal to exert
effort e. For later reference, notice that if (IC) were not binding, then the optimal solution
to the maximization problem would entail first best effort,
eFB(∆) = argmax
e
e(Π +∆)− ψ(e)
Given our specification for the effort cost function, ψ(e) = βe2/2, first best effort is
eFB(∆) = (Π +∆)/β
To understand how the threat of termination affects the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert
effort, we need to know whether the threat of termination is credible following a deviation
from the target effort level e. We say the threat of termination is credible if and only if for
any e′ < e the strategic investor prefers to terminate the project. Formally, for any e′ < e,
e′(R+∆) < R0 (3)
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The following lemma gives a necessary condition for the threat of termination to be credible.
Lemma 1 Under strategic investor financing, the threat of termination is credible only if
∆ ≤ L− (I − w)
eout
Proof. By (CO) and (3), the threat of termination is credible if and only if in equilibrium
the strategic investor is just indifferent between continuation and termination,
e(R+∆) = R0
Substituting for the break–even constraint (IR), this expression reduces to I−w+eout∆ = R0,
which is feasible (i.e., R0 ≤ L) if and only if ∆ ≤ (L− (I − w))/eout. ✷
In other words, the threat of termination is credible only if the strategic externality
is not too large (and the liquidation value of the project is not too small either).5 To
see the intuition, notice that the strategic investor’s continuation payoff is increasing in
∆ via its effect on his outside option payoff (i.e., I − w + eout∆). Consequently, as the
strategic externality increases, the strategic investor has more to lose from terminating the
project. This weakens his commitment to terminate the project, and thereby undermines
the credibility of the termination threat. We are now in the position to state the following
result:
Lemma 2 Suppose the entrepreneur undertakes her project with the strategic investor.
Then:
5It is worth emphasizing that asking the investor to post a bond which would be lost if the project were
continued does not allow to improve the credibility of the termination threat. The reason is that, ultimately,
the investor will have to recoup the bond via an increase in the final repayment, otherwise he would not break
even. This in turn means that he holds a larger stake in the continuation value of the project, which precisely
offsets the additional payment from the bond which the investor would receive if he terminated the project.
To see this more formally, suppose the investor provides funding T > I−w, so that T −(I−w) constitutes the
bond. In an equilibrium in which the threat of termination imposed by the strategic investor is credible we
must have (i) in equilibrium the investor is indifferent between continuation and termination, e(R+∆) = R0,
(ii) R0 does not exceed the sum of the liquidation value and the bond (limited liability), R0 ≤ L+T −(I−w),
(iii) the strategic investor makes zero profits, e(R+∆) = T + eout∆. It is straightforward to show that these
conditions reduce to the condition stated in Lemma 1. In other words, the bond is irrelevant.
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(i) For ∆ ≤ (L− (I−w))/eout (threat of termination credible), the incentive–compatibility
constraint (IC) is not binding, i.e., the entrepreneur exerts efficient effort
eFB(∆) = (Π +∆)/β
An optimal contract entails R = (I−w+ eout∆)/eFB(∆)−∆ and R0 = I−w+ eout∆.
(ii) For ∆ > (L − (I − w))/eout (threat of termination not credible), effort is second best
and given by
e∗ =
Π+∆+
√
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eout∆)
2β
< eFB(∆) (4)
An optimal contract entails R = (I − w + eout∆)/e∗ −∆ and R0 = L.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the first part of the lemma, notice that under the optimal contract the
strategic investor is just indifferent between project continuation and termination if and only
if the entrepreneur exerts efficient effort. Hence, if the entrepreneur exerted less than efficient
effort, then the strategic investor would terminate the project. This, in turn, ensures that
the entrepreneur has no incentive to shirk. The second part of the lemma shows what can
be implemented when the threat of termination lacks credibility. In this case, the strategic
investor prefers to continue the project for any e′ ≥ e− ǫ, where ǫ > 0 but sufficiently small.
Consequently, the entrepreneur’s payoff from exerting effort e′ ≥ e− ǫ is e′(Π−R)− ψ(e′),
which in turn implies that e is incentive–compatible only if Π − R = ψ′(e). As a result,
efficient effort is no longer implementable (since R > −∆).
We next characterize the outcome under independent investor financing:
Corollary 1 Under independent investor financing the entrepreneur exerts effort
eout =


eFB(0) = Π/β for L ≥ I − w (threat of termination credible)
Π+
√
Π2−4β(I−w)
2β < e
FB(0) for L < I − w (threat of termination not credible)
An optimal contract entails R = (I − w)/eout and R0 = min[I − w,L].
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 by setting ∆ = 0. ✷
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Notice that the condition under which the termination threat is credible is less stringent
under independent than under strategic investor financing. In other words, an independent
investor is more committed to discipline the entrepreneur for poor performance than a strate-
gic investor. This highlights a major point we wish to make: while the strategic externality
makes it more worthwhile for the strategic investor to elicit high effort, it may also under-
mine his commitment to discipline the entrepreneur for poor performance by terminating
the project. This may weaken the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort and potentially
result in inferior effort. To have an interesting tradeoff between strategic and independent
investor financing, we assume in what follows that the threat of termination is credible un-
der independent investor financing, i.e., we restrict attention to the case L ≥ I − w.6 The
entrepreneur’s payoff under independent investor financing is then given by 7
V independent = eFB(0)Π− ψ(eFB(0))− (I − w) (5)
Notice that, by (1), (5) strictly exceeds the entrepreneur’s personal wealth w.
At this stage, one may still wonder why, for the case ∆ > (L − (I − w))/eout, the
entrepreneur and the strategic investor cannot do better by simply mimicking the outcome
under independent investor financing. To see why, suppose the parties adopted the contract
that is optimal under independent investor financing, (R,R0) = ((I − w)/eFB(0), I − w).
Under this contract, the strategic investor is willing to finance the project if and only if the
entrepreneur exerts effort
e′ ≥ eFB(0) I − w
I − w + eFB(0)∆
By inspection, the right hand side of this inequality is strictly smaller than eFB(0), and it
is decreasing in ∆. In other words, the larger the strategic benefit, the more reluctant is
the strategic investor to exercise the termination threat in the event shirking. Anticipating
the strategic investor’s lack of commitment to penalize slack, the entrepreneur will exert less
effort than eFB(0), and consequently the strategic investor will not break even under the
contract that is optimal under independent investor financing.
6See the Appendix for a characterization of the case L < I − w.
7To see this in more detail, notice that the entrepreneur’s residual payoff is eFB(0)(Π− R)− ψ(eFB(0)),
where R = (I − w)/eFB(0) is the repayment to the investor in the high cash flow state. Substituting for R
and rearranging terms yields (5).
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3.2 Choice of Financing Source
We now characterize the choice between strategic and independent investor financing. The
entrepreneur prefers strategic over independent investor financing if and only if strategic
investor financing is feasible (i.e., (4) is a real number) and her payoff under independent
investor financing does not exceed her payoff under strategic investor financing. The en-
trepreneur’s payoff strategic investor financing, if feasible, is
e(Π +∆)− ψ(e)− (I − w)− eFB(0)∆ (6)
where e denotes the equilibrium effort level under strategic investor financing (see Lemma
2). Notice that (5) does not exceed (6) if and only if
e(Π +∆)− ψ(e) ≥ eFB(0)(Π +∆)− ψ(eFB(0))
This reduces to e ≥ eFB(0).8 Thus, strategic investor financing is the preferred financing
choice if and only if it is feasible and e ≥ eFB(0). We now have the following result:
Proposition 1 Suppose the threat of termination is credible under independent investor
financing, L ≥ I − w. Then, there are thresholds ∆ = (L − (I − w))/eFB(0) and ∆¯ =
Π +
√
4β(I − w), with ∆ < ∆¯, such that
(i) for ∆ ∈ (0,∆], the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor and exerts first
best effort eFB(∆).
(ii) for ∆ ∈ (∆, ∆¯), the entrepreneur is financed by an independent investor and exerts
effort eFB(0).
(iii) for ∆ ≥ ∆¯, the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor and exerts effort
e∗ =
Π+∆+
√
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eFB(0)∆)
2β
∈
(
eFB(0), eFB(∆)
)
(7)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 provides an illustration. For ∆ ≤ ∆, the threat of termination is credible under
strategic investor financing, and hence efficient effort is implementable. Strategic investor
8This follows from eFB(∆) = argmaxe′ e
′(Π+∆)− ψ(e′), e ≤ eFB(∆), eFB(0) ≤ eFB(∆), and concavity.
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Figure 2: Performance and Financing Choice
financing is then the preferred financing choice as it facilitates the internalization of the
strategic benefit. For ∆ > ∆, the threat of termination lacks credibility under strategic
investor financing, while it is credible under independent investor financing. In this case,
strategic investor financing is the preferred financing choice only if the second best effort
level under strategic investor financing exceeds the first best effort level under independent
investor financing (i.e., e > eFB(0), where e is given by (4)).9 By inspection, this will be the
case if and only if the repayment under strategic investor financing is negative.10 To see why
this can be an equilibrium outcome, suppose the strategic investor were to accept a negative
repayment. If so, then equilibrium effort—and hence the expected value of the strategic
benefit—would be higher under strategic than under independent investor financing. As ∆
becomes sufficiently large (i.e., ∆ ≥ ∆¯), the gain due to enhanced expected value of the
strategic benefit becomes so strong that it induces the strategic investor to indeed accept a
negative repayment. One interpretation of this result is that the investor enters a “strategic
alliance” with the entrepreneur where the investor not only invests upfront but also commits
9In addition, it must be the case that strategic investor financing is feasible, i.e., (4) is a real number.
10To see why, notice that the effort level under independent investor financing is characterized by Π =
ψ′(eFB(0)), while under strategic investor financing it is characterized by Π − R = ψ′(e) (given that the
termination threat lacks credibility). Thus, by concavity, e > eFB(0) if and only if R < 0.
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to make an additional payment upon the achievement of a “milestone”.11 It is worth noting
that this outcome occurs only if the project return is relatively less important than the
strategic benefit (i.e., Π < ∆). For intermediate values of ∆, however, strategic investor
financing is either not feasible or would result in inferior effort, and hence independent
investor financing is the preferred financing choice.
The comparative statics are as follows. As the external financing burden I−w increases,
the threshold ∆ decreases and ∆¯ increases. Thus an increase in the magnitude of the
entrepreneur’s capital constraint reduces the range of parameter values under which the
project is financed by the strategic investor. Essentially, this is because the strategic investor
will have to be given a larger stake in the project when I−w increases. This not only makes it
more likely that the threat of termination lacks credibility but also reduces the entrepreneur’s
incentive to exert effort when the threat of termination does lack credibility. For these two
reasons, financing by the strategic investor becomes relatively less attractive.
An increase in the project return Π also reduces the range of parameter values under
which the project is financed by the strategic investor. In particular, as Π increases, the
threshold ∆ decreases and the threshold ∆¯ increases. The intuition behind both observations
is that an increase in Π enhances the effort level that the entrepreneur would exert if she were
financed by an independent investor. Thus, as Π increases, the strategic investor’s outside
option payoff increases. This not only makes it more likely that the threat of termination
will lack credibility under strategic investor financing (i.e., ∆ decreases), but also increases
the extent to which strategic investor financing is not feasible (i.e., ∆¯ increases).
Lastly, the effect of an increase in the strategic externality on the entrepreneur’s financing
choice is non–monotonic. For small values of ∆, the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic
investor and effort is increasing in ∆. At ∆, the entrepreneur switches to independent investor
financing and effort drops to eFB(0). For very large values of ∆, the entrepreneur is again
financed by the strategic investor, and effort is increasing in ∆. Conditional on the project
being financed a strategic investor, however, there is an unambiguously positive relationship
11Such contracting arrangements are frequently observed in the biotechnology industry where established
pharmaceutical companies regularly enter alliances with biotechnology ventures. For example, in 2006, Gen-
mab, a Danish biotechnology firm, entered a strategic alliance with GlaxoSmithKline, a UK drug firm, under
which GlaxoSmithKline not only invested $357m upfront but also offered milestone payments worth up to
$1.6b provided Genmab’s drug meets expectations (see The Economist, June 12, 2008).
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between the performance of the project and the size of the strategic externality.12
These comparative statics give rise to a number of empirical implications. These will be
discussed in more detail in Section 5.
4 Discussion & Extensions
In this section, we provide a discussion of some of the assumptions of the base model.
Subsection 4.1 relaxes the assumption that the parties can commit to not renegotiate the
contract. Subsection 4.2 looks at the case where the strategic externality in the event of
project success depends on which party finances the project. Subsection 4.3 provides a
discussion of our assumption that the entrepreneur has the full contract bargaining power
vis–a`–vis the strategic investor. Subsection 4.4 considers the case of deal syndication where
the entrepreneur establishes a contracting relationship with both types of investors.
4.1 Renegotiation
Thus far we have assumed that the parties can commit to not renegotiate the contract in
place. We now show that the previous analysis does not rely on this assumption. Rene-
gotiation comes into consideration when the investor prefers to terminate the project but
termination is inefficient. In this case, the parties have an incentive to renegotiate the con-
tract as to effectively avoid termination of the project. To induce the investor to continue
the project, the entrepreneur will have to increase the investor’s stake in the project. Faced
with threat, the entrepreneur will have no incentive to provide less than efficient effort.
To see this more formally, consider the case of strategic investor financing and suppose the
entrepreneur were to exert effort e′ = eFB(∆)− ǫ, where ǫ > 0 but sufficiently small (so that
project continuation is still efficient). In this case, if the threat of termination is credible, the
strategic investor prefers to terminate the project under the status–quo contract. However,
since project termination is inefficient, the parties can increase their joint payoff by signing
a new contract and avoiding termination. The outcome of renegotiation then depends on
the allocation of bargaining power between the parties. If the entrepreneur has the full
bargaining power in renegotiation, then she offers the strategic investor to swap his claim
12This amounts to eFB(∆) < e∗(∆¯). It is straightforward to show that this inequality holds.
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R into a new claim R′ such that the strategic investor is just indifferent between project
continuation and termination, i.e.,
e′(R′ +∆) = R0
Thus the entrepreneur’s payoff from the deviation is
e′(Π−R′)− ψ(e′) = e′(Π +∆)−R0 − ψ(e′) (8)
which is maximized at eFB(∆). Consequently, the entrepreneur has no incentive to devi-
ate from eFB(∆) (the complete proof can be found in the Appendix). Conversely, if the
entrepreneur did not have the full bargaining power in renegotiation, then her payoff from
deviating would be even lower than (8). Hence, she would have no incentive to deviate either.
Notice too that following effort e ≥ eFB(∆), the strategic investor (at least weakly) prefers to
continue the project under the status–quo contract. Hence, the project is continued without
renegotiation, irrespective of who has the bargaining power in renegotiation.
4.2 Endogenous Strategic Benefits
We have assumed that the size of the strategic benefit in the event of project success does
not depend on whether the project is financed by the strategic or an independent investor.
We now show how the analysis would be altered if this assumption were not satisfied. To
fix ideas, suppose the strategic benefit is δ∆ (where δ < 1) if the project is financed by an
independent investor, and ∆ if the project is financed by the strategic investor. The idea
is that the strategic investor may not be able to capture the full strategic benefit if the
project is not financed by him, e.g., due to lack of control rights or monitoring capabilities
aimed at protecting strategic benefits and avoiding their dissipation to third parties. Another
example would be vendor (or trade) financing where a company provides a loan to a customer
to finance the purchase of products. In this case, the strategic benefit may stem from the
possibility to engage in repeat business in the future. It seems plausible that the vendor
can increase its chances to secure future deals by establishing an early financing relationship
with its customer. The parameter δ would then denote the probability of winning a future
deal when the company does not provide vendor finance.
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The strategic investor’s outside option payoff is now given by I − w + eoutδ∆. Conse-
quently, the threat of termination is credible under strategic investor financing only if
∆ ≤ L− (I − w)
eoutδ
Notice that as δ decreases, this inequality becomes less stringent. This highlights again
the point made earlier: what matters for the credibility of termination threat is the size
of the strategic investor’s outside option payoff, i.e., the payoff that he would derive if the
project were financed by an independent investor. As δ decreases, the strategic investor’s
outside option payoff—and hence equilibrium continuation payoff—decreases. Consequently,
the strategic investor has less to lose from terminating the project, which in turn strengthens
the credibility of the termination threat.
If the threat of termination is not credible under strategic investor financing, then first
best effort is not implementable. Second best effort under strategic investor financing is
e∗ =
Π+∆+
√
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eoutδ∆)
2β
(9)
Thus, as δ decreases, effort increases and hence the range of parameter values for which
strategic investor financing is the preferred financing choice widens. Intuitively, as δ de-
creases, the strategic investor becomes more eager to finance the project in attempt to reap
the full strategic benefit. This makes the strategic investor willing to accept a lower stake in
the project, which in turn induces the entrepreneur to exert more effort. A key implication
of this analysis is that as control considerations and strategic benefit protection motives
become more important, strategic investor financing becomes more effective and a fortiori
more important.
4.3 Contract Bargaining Power
We have assumed that the entrepreneur has the full contract bargaining power vis–a`–vis
the strategic investor. This is arguably a strong and somewhat ad hoc assumption. In
what follows, we provide a brief discussion how the analysis would be altered if we assumed
alternatively that the strategic investor makes a take–it–or–leave–it contract offer to the
entrepreneur. At the same time, we maintain our initial assumption that the entrepreneur
has the full bargaining power vis–a`–vis independent investors. The justification for this
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assumption stems from the fact that there are several independent investors in our model.
Bertrand competition among independent investors drives their profits down to zero.
Consider an equilibrium candidate in which the entrepreneur is financed by the strate-
gic investor. Since the strategic investor makes a take–it–or–leave–it contract offer to the
entrepreneur, the contracting problem is
max
(e∈[0,1],R≤Π,R0≤L)
e(R+∆) (10)
s.t.
e(R+∆) ≥ R0 (CO)
e(Π−R)− ψ(e) ≥ V independent (IR)
e is incentive–compatible (IC)
where (10) is the strategic investor’s payoff and (IR) now denotes the entrepreneur’s par-
ticipation constraint (which may or may not be binding). The right hand side of (IR) is
the entrepreneur’s payoff from undertaking her project with an independent investor, (5).
Notice that strategic investor financing will be the equilibrium financing mode if and only if
at the optimal solution the strategic investor’s payoff is not smaller than his outside option
payoff, that is,
e(R+∆) ≥ I − w + eFB(0)∆ (11)
If (11) does not hold at the optimal solution of the contracting problem specified above,
then the entrepreneur undertakes her project with an independent investor. The following
proposition, whose proof is relegated to the Appendix, describes the equilibrium outcome
(the thresholds are defined in Proposition 1):
Proposition 2 Suppose the strategic investor has the full bargaining power vis–a`–vis the
entrepreneur. Then:
(i) for ∆ ∈ (0,∆], the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor and exerts first
best effort eFB(∆).
(ii) for ∆ ∈ (∆, ∆¯), the entrepreneur is financed by an independent investor and exerts
effort eFB(0).
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(iii) for ∆ ≥ ∆¯, the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor and exerts second best
effort e∗∗ = (Π +∆)/(2β) ∈ (eFB(0), e∗], where e∗ is given by (7).13
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the strategic investor has bargaining power vis–a`–vis the entrepreneur, he may
tempted to exploit it and ask for a higher stake in the project than he does receive under the
perfect competition scenario considered above. This has two potential effects. First, it may
threaten the credibility of the termination threat in that the strategic investor becomes more
reluctant to shut down the project. Second, if the threat of termination is not credible, then
an increase in the strategic investor’s stake will reduce the entrepreneur’s residual payoff,
which in turn makes it less worthwhile for her to exert high effort. The proposition shows
that the first effect does not materialize. Intuitively, extracting a higher rent from the
entrepreneur at the expense of losing the credibility of the termination threat is too costly
for the strategic investor, as it would result in a too large decrease in effort. The second effect
does materialize, however. Specifically, for ∆ > ∆¯, the strategic investor will extract a larger
payment relative to the case where the entrepreneur has the full bargaining power, which
in turn results in an additional effort distortion. An any rate, however, the key message of
Proposition 1 is not altered under the alternative assumption of the strategic investor having
the full contract bargaining power.
4.4 Syndication
Thus far we have assumed that the entrepreneur cannot be financed by more than one
investor, i.e., we have excluded the possibility of syndicated financing. This is a plausible
assumption for the case of smaller ventures, where the transaction cost of syndicated lending
is arguably prohibitively high, but it seems a too restrictive assumption for the case of larger
deals. This section sheds light on deal syndication where the entrepreneur establishes a
contracting relationship with both the strategic and an independent investor.
We again restrict attention to the case L ≥ I − w. From the previous section, we know
that as long as the threat of termination is credible under strategic investor financing, i.e.,
∆ ≤ ∆, the project is financed by the strategic investor and the first best is implemented. For
13Notice that e∗∗ = e∗ at ∆ = ∆¯ and e∗∗ < e∗ for ∆ > ∆¯.
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∆ > ∆, however, the threat of termination lacks credibility under strategic investor financing.
In this case, as we will show now, financial discipline can be restored and efficiency enhanced
by bringing an independent investor on board. More specifically, consider the following
arrangement: the entrepreneur secures financing T i from an independent investor and T s =
I−w−T i from a strategic investor. The strategic investor then takes the role of monitoring
the entrepreneur’s effort choice and potentially disciplining her for poor performance. In
other words, the liquidation control right is allocated to the strategic investor. By contrast,
the independent investor takes a passive role and is at arm’s length (and hence does not
observe the entrepreneur’s effort choice). To ensure that the threat of termination is credible,
it must be the case that in equilibrium the strategic investor is just indifferent between project
continuation and termination. It also must be the case that the payment that the strategic
investor would receive if he terminated the project does not exceed the liquidation proceeds.
That is,
e(Rs +∆) = R0 ≤ L (12)
where Rs denotes the strategic investor’s claim. Furthermore, under an optimal contract,
the strategic investor just breaks even in equilibrium,
e(Rs +∆) = I − w − T i + eFB(0)∆
Substituting for this expression, inequality (12) reduces to
I − w − T i + eFB(0)∆ = R0 ≤ L
Thus, to ensure that the threat of termination is credible, the independent investor’s contri-
bution to the financing of the project must satisfy
T i ≥ I − w − L+ eFB(0)∆ (13)
Notice that, by ∆ > ∆, the right hand side of this expression is strictly positive.
Proposition 3 Suppose ∆ > ∆. Then, as long as renegotiation is not possible, the follow-
ing syndication deal implements first best effort eFB(∆): (i) the strategic and independent
investor invest T s = L − eFB(0)∆ and T i = I − w − L + eFB(0)∆ and are given claims
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Rs = (T s + eFB(0)∆)/eFB(∆) − ∆ and Ri = T i/eFB(∆), respectively;14 (ii) the strategic
investor is given the right to terminate the project and seize liquidation proceeds L.
Proof. We first show that eFB(∆) is incentive–compatible. Notice that under the contract
specified in the proposition, the strategic investor prefers to continue the project if and only
if e ≥ eFB(∆). Consequently, the entrepreneur’s payoff from exerting effort e is
U(e) =
{
e
(
Π−Rs −Ri)− ψ(e) for e ≥ eFB(∆)
−ψ(e) for e < eFB(∆)
This is maximized at e = eFB(∆). To show that the deal is optimal, it suffices to note
that efficient effort is implemented, investors just break even, and the project is continued
in equilibrium. ✷
The main effect of deal syndication is that it allows to reduce the strategic investor’s
stake in the project. This makes him less reluctant to terminate the project in the event
of poor performance, which in turn restores the credibility of the termination threat. Thus,
syndicating the deal and bringing in an independent investor restores financial discipline and
enhances the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort.15
14Notice that the strategic investor’s investment contribution will be negative for ∆ large. This may be hard
to interpret. An alternative syndication deal implementing first best effort would be the following: the strate-
gic and independent investor invest zero and T i = I−w and are given claims Rs = −∆+eFB(0)/eFB(∆)∆ < 0
and Ri = T i/eFB(∆), respectively, and the independent investor is given the right to terminate the project
and seize liquidation proceeds I − w. The difference is that now the independent investor takes the role
of potentially disciplining the entrepreneur for poor performance. The strategic investor no longer invests
upfront but commits to pay a reward conditional on project success.
15It should be noted that the proposition is not entirely robust to the possibility of renegotiation. To
see this, notice that efficient effort eFB(∆) does not maximize the joint continuation payoff of the strategic
investor and the entrepreneur, i.e., e(Π + ∆ − Ri) − ψ(e). In consequence, if the strategic investor and the
entrepreneur were free to renegotiate the contract, efficient effort would not be incentive–compatible. More
specifically, one can show that in this case equilibrium effort would be characterized by the following first
order condition:
Π +∆−
I − w − L+ eFB(0)∆
e
= ψ′(e)
The corresponding solution would be inferior to efficient effort but still superior to equilibrium effort level
in the absence of syndication (Proposition 1). In other words, deal syndication enhances efficiency even if
renegotiation is possible.
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5 Conclusion and Empirical Implications
Strategic objectives can make an investor willing to finance a project at low cost, but they
may also interfere with the investor’s financial discipline and threaten his commitment to
discipline poorly performing entrepreneurs. The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that
this tradeoff has implications for the provision of entrepreneurial incentives, project per-
formance, the design of corporate venturing deals, and the choice between strategic and
financial investors. We conclude with a discussion of the model’s empirical implications.
Our first set of empirical predictions concerns the choice of financing source between
strategic and financial investors. The model predicts that an increase in the investment
outlay I and a decrease in the entrepreneur’s net worth w make it less likely that the
entrepreneur will be financed by a strategic investor. The model thus suggests that strategic
investors, such as corporate venture capitalists, finance relatively small ventures with less
binding financial constraints. We are not aware of empirical evidence along those lines.
The model also predicts a positive relationship between the strength of strategic benefits
and project success.16 This is consistent with Gompers and Lerner (1998). Using the like-
lihood of going public as a proxy for success, they find that corporate venture investments
are significantly more successful than other investments in their sample. They also find that
if a dummy variable denoting corporate venture investments with a strategic fit is added to
the regressions, the corporate venture dummy variable becomes insignificant (and frequently
negative). In other words, corporate venture investments in general do not perform better,
only those with a strategic fit do. Chemmanur and Loutskina (2008) report that the proba-
bility of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition) is higher in corporate venture capital (CVC)
backed firms compared to independent venture capital (IVC) backed firms. They also find
that corporate venture capitalists are more likely to select portfolio companies in industries
closely related to that of the corporate parents.17
The model also provides insights into the choice of contractual or organizational form
in strategic venturing. As seen in Section 3, the model suggests that if strategic benefits
16This, however, does not necessarily imply that an increase in the strength of strategic benefits entails an
increase in efficiency. As explained earlier, the reason is that an increase in the strategic benefit may induce
the entrepreneur to secure financing from an independent, purely financial investor.
17However, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2008) also find that CVC–backed firms tend to underperform
IVC–backed firms in terms of operating performance for the first five years after an IPO.
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are high relative to the stand–alone return of the project, then strategic investors choose
strategic alliances whereby the investor not only invests upfront but also commits to make
additional milestone payments. By contrast, if project returns are more important than
strategic benefits, then “traditional” corporate venturing should be more prevalent. To the
best of our knowledge, this prediction has not been tested yet.
Our framework also sheds light on the role of deal syndication in the context of corporate
venturing. In our model, sharing the investment burden with an independent venture cap-
italist enhances the financial discipline of a corporate venture capitalist, which in turn has
positive implications for the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort. This may well explain
for why larger corporate venturing deals, where the transaction cost of deal syndication is
small relative to the size of the project, are frequently co–financed by a corporation and in-
dependent venture capitalists. Our approach thus suggests that corporate and independent
venture capital are actually complements, rather than substitutes (see Birkinshaw and Hill
2003 for suggestive evidence along those lines).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider an equilibrium candidate in which the project is financed by the strategic investor.
(i) Case ∆ ≤ (L− (I −w))/eout. Given the contract specified in the lemma, the strategic investor
is willing to continue the project if and only if e′ ≥ eFB(∆). Thus the entrepreneur’s payoff
from exerting effort e′ is
U(e′) =
{
e′(Π−R)− ψ(e′) for e′ ≥ eFB(∆)
L−R0 − ψ(e′) for e′ < eFB(∆)
(14)
where R = (I − w + eout∆) − ∆ and R0 = I − w + eout∆. We now show that eFB(∆) =
argmaxe′ U(e
′). Notice that argmaxe′≥eF B(∆) U(e
′) = eFB(∆) (by R > −∆) and
U(eFB(∆)) = eFB(∆)(Π +∆)− ψ(eFB(∆))− (I − w)− eout∆
> max
e′<eF B(∆)
U(e′) = L− (I − w)− eout∆
by eFB(∆)(Π + ∆) − ψ(eFB(∆)) > I > L (otherwise, the project would not have been un-
dertaken in the first place). To show that the contract is optimal, it suffices to note that
the contract is feasible, implements efficient effort, and ensures that the strategic investor just
breaks even and continues the project in equilibrium.
We now show that the contract remains optimal when the parties cannot commit not to rene-
gotiate the contract (see Subsection 4.1). Suppose the entrepreneur exerts effort e′ and con-
sider the subgame at the project continuation stage. For e′ ≥ eFB(∆), the strategic investor
prefers to continue the project and continuation is efficient, and hence the project is continued
without renegotiation. For e′ < L/(Π + ∆), the strategic investor prefers to terminate and
termination is efficient, and hence the project is terminated without renegotiation. Finally,
for e′ ∈ [L/(Π +∆), eFB(∆)), the strategic investor prefers to terminate, but termination is
inefficient and hence the parties the parties have an incentive to renegotiate the contract as
to effectively avoid termination. Let us assume momentarily that the entrepreneur has the
full bargaining power in renegotiation. In renegotiation, the entrepreneur offers the investor
to swap his claim R into a new claim R′ such that the investor is just willing to continue, i.e.,
e′(R′ + ∆) = R0 (notice that R
′ = R0/e
′ − ∆ ≤ Π by e′ ≥ L/(Π + ∆) and R0 ≤ L). The
entrepreneur’s payoff function is then given by
U(e′) =


L− (I − w + eout∆)− ψ(e′) for e′ < L/(Π +∆)
e′(Π +∆)− (I − w + eout∆)− ψ(e′) for e′ ∈ [L/(Π +∆), eFB(∆))
e′
(
Π− ((I − w + eout∆) /eFB(∆)−∆))− ψ(e′) for e′ ≥ eFB(∆)
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By inspection, U(e′) is maximized at eFB(∆). Notice that eFB(∆) is incentive–compatible
regardless of which party has the bargaining power in renegotiation, for if the strategic investor
had the bargaining power then the entrepreneur’s payoff from exerting effort e′ would be given
by (14), which, as shown above, is maximized at eFB(∆).
(ii) Case ∆ > (L − (I − w))/eout. In this case, the strategic investor necessarily strictly prefers
to continue the project in equilibrium. There thus exists a constant ǫ > 0 such that for any
e′ ≥ e − ǫ the project is continued. In consequence, the entrepreneur’s payoff from exerting
effort e′ ≥ e− ǫ is e′(Π−R)− ψ(e′), and hence e is incentive–compatible only if
Π−R = ψ′(e) (15)
Now suppose (15) is not only necessary but also sufficient for incentive–compatibility. In this
case, an optimal contract solves
max
e∈[0,1],R≤Π,R0≤L
e(Π−R)− ψ(e)
subject to (CO), (IR), and (15). This is solved for the contract specified in the lemma. Equi-
librium effort is then given by the largest solution of
Π−
(
(I − w − eout∆)/e−∆
)
= βe
where we made use of ψ′(e) = βe. This yields (4). It remains to be shown that (15) is
sufficient for incentive–compatibility. To this end, we need to show that the entrepreneur has
no incentive to induce the strategic investor to terminate the project. If the entrepreneur had
such an incentive then she would exert zero effort and derive a payoff of L − R0 = 0. Yet,
the entrepreneur’s equilibrium payoff must be non–negative, otherwise the entrepreneur would
have preferred to consume her internal funds which would have secured her a payoff of w.
Hence, (15) is sufficient for incentive–compatibility.
Proof of Proposition 1
For ∆ ≤ ∆ ≡ (L− (I −w))/eout, first best effort is implementable under strategic investor financing.
In consequence, the entrepreneur’s payoff from undertaking the project with the strategic investor
exceeds her payoff from undertaking the project with an independent investor (which in turn exceeds
her personal wealth w). Hence the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor.
For ∆ > ∆, equilibrium effort under strategic investor financing, if feasible, is
e∗ =
Π+∆+
√
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eout∆)
2β
(16)
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Consequently, we have e∗ ≥ eout if and only if
√
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eout∆) ≥ 2βeout − (Π +∆) (17)
Moreover, e∗ exists (i.e., is a real number) if and only if the term inside the square root is non–negative,
(Π +∆)2 − 4β(I − w + eout∆) ≥ 0 (18)
Substituting for eout = Π/β, this inequality reduces to
(Π−∆)2 ≥ 4β(I − w)
This holds if and only if ∆ ≤ Π−√4β(I − w) or ∆ ≥ Π+√4β(I − w). Conversely, (17) reduces to
√
(Π−∆)2 − 4β(I − w) ≥ Π−∆
which holds for ∆ ≥ Π+
√
4β(I − w) but it does not hold for ∆ ≤ Π−
√
4β(I − w). Consequently,
(17) and (18) hold if and only if ∆ ≥ Π+√4β(I − w) ≡ ∆¯. To show that ∆ = (L− (I −w))/eout <
∆¯ = Π +
√
4β(I − w), it suffices note that
eout
(
Π+
√
4β(I − w)
)
> eoutΠ > I > L > L− (I − w)
In sum, for L ≥ I −w, the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor if and only if ∆ ≤ ∆ or
∆ ≥ ∆¯. Otherwise, she is financed by an independent investor.
Consider now the case L < I − w (not reported in the main text). In this case, the threat of
termination is not credible under independent investor financing (and hence it is not credible under
strategic investor financing either). Consequently, by Corollary 1 and assuming that financing by an
independent investor is feasible (i.e., eout defined below is a real number) and individual rational for
the entrepreneur (i.e., the net present value of the project is positive), we have
eout =
Π+
√
Π2 − 4β(I − w)
2β
Substituting for this expression, (16) reduces to
e∗ =
Π+∆+
√
(
√
Π2 − 4β(I − w)−∆)2
2β
Hence,
e∗ =


Π+
√
Π2−4β(I−w)
2β = e
out for ∆ ≤
√
Π2 − 4β(I − w)
Π+2∆−
√
Π2−4β(I−w)
2β > e
out otherwise
Consequently, for ∆ ≤
√
Π2 − 4β(I − w), the choice of financing source is irrelevant, while for ∆ >√
Π2 − 4β(I − w) the entrepreneur strictly prefers strategic investor financing.
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Proof of Proposition 2
We first show that for ∆ ∈ (0,∆] the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor and efficient
effort eFB(∆) is implemented. Let us momentarily assume that the strategic investor prefers to design
the contract such that the threat of termination is credible, i.e., (CO) holds with equality. Assuming
that (IC) is slack (to be verified later), the contracting problem reduces to
max
(e∈[0,1],R0≤L)
R0
s.t.
e(Π +∆)−R0 − ψ(e) ≥ eFB(0)Π− (I − w)− ψ(eFB(0)) (IR’)
where we substituted for R = R0/e − ∆. By inspection, as long as (IR’) is slack, this problem is
maximized at R0 = L. Thus, since e = e
FB(∆) relaxes (IR’) as much as possible, (IR’) is slack if and
only if
eFB(∆)(Π +∆)− L− ψ(eFB(∆)) ≥ eFB(0)Π− (I − w)− ψ(eFB(0)) (19)
It is straightforward to show that (19) holds if and only if ∆ ≥ √Π2 + 2β(L− (I − w)) − Π ≡ ∆ˆ
where ∆ˆ < ∆ = (L− (I − w))/eFB(0). Hence we need to consider two cases:
(i) for ∆ < ∆ˆ, (IR’) is binding and the problem reduces to
max
e∈[0,1]
R0 = e(Π +∆)− ψ(e)−
(
eFB(0)Π− (I − w)− ψ(eFB(0))
)
which is solved for e = eFB(∆). The proof that eFB(∆) is incentive–compatible is similar to the
proof of Lemma 2 and hence omitted. To show that the strategic investor is not better off under
an alternative contract under which the threat of termination is not credible, it suffices to note
that efficient effort is implemented and the entrepreneur’s rent is fully extracted. Lastly, notice
that the strategic investor is not better off under the outside option of letting the entrepreneur
be financed by an independent investor, since
eFB(∆)(Π +∆)− ψ(eFB(∆))−
(
eFB(0)Π− (I − w)− ψ(eFB(0))
)
> I − w + eFB(0)∆
by eFB(∆) > eFB(0).
(ii) for ∆ ∈ [∆ˆ,∆], (IR’) is slack. In this case, if the strategic investor prefers to design the
contract such the threat of termination is credible, an optimal contract entails R0 = L, R =
L/eFB(∆)−∆ and e = eFB(∆). The proof that eFB(∆) is incentive–compatible is similar to
the proof of Lemma 2 and hence omitted. To show that the strategic investor is not better off
under the outside option, notice that L ≥ I − w + eFB(0)∆ since ∆ ≤ ∆.
It remains to be shown that the strategic investor is not better off under an alternative contract
under which the threat of termination is not credible (i.e., (CO) holds with strict inequality). If
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the threat of termination is not credible, then the incentive–compatibility constraint is Π−R =
ψ′(e). The contracting problem reduces to
P :
max
(e∈[0,1])
e(Π− ψ′(e) + ∆)
s.t.
eψ′(e)− ψ(e) ≥ V independent (IR”)
where we substituted for R = Π−ψ′(e). If (IR”) were slack, then this problem would be solved
for e = (Π +∆)/(2β). This, however, would be strictly inferior to eFB(0) = Π/β (by ∆ < Π),
which would violate individual rationality.18 Consequently, (IR”) must be binding. This yields
e =
√
2V independent/β. It remains to be shown that
√
2V independent/β < eFB(0) = Π/β (which
again would violate individual rationality). Substituting for V independent, it is straightforward
to show that the previous inequality reduces to Π2 − 2β(I − w) < Π2, which holds by I > w.
In summary, we have shown that for ∆ ≤ ∆ the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor
and efficient effort eFB(∆) is implemented, as in Proposition 1.
Consider next the case ∆ > ∆. In this case, the threat of termination cannot be credible under
strategic investor financing, and hence the contracting problem under strategic investor financing
reduces to problem P stated above. We know from above that (IR”) cannot be binding (otherwise, the
optimal solution would entail e < eFB(0), violating individual rationality). Thus, in an equilibrium
in which the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic investor, (IR”) must be slack, i.e., e = (Π +
∆)/(2β) ≡ e∗∗. Notice that e∗∗ ≥ eFB(0) if and only if ∆ ≥ Π. The strategic investor’s individual
rationality constraint is
e∗∗(Π− ψ′(e∗∗) + ∆) = (Π +∆)
2
4β
≥ I − w + eFB(0)∆ = I − w +Π2/β (20)
This inequality holds if and only if ∆ ≥ Π +
√
4β(I − w) = ∆¯ or ∆ ≤ Π −
√
4β(I − w). Yet for
∆ ≤ Π −√4β(I − w), we have e∗∗ < eFB(0), which again would violate individual rationality. It
remains to be shown that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint is indeed slack (for ∆ ≥ ∆).
Substituting for e∗∗, it is straightforward to show that the entrepreneur’s participation constraint can
be expressed as
(Π +∆)2
4β
≥ Π2/β − 2(I − w)
This holds by (20) and ∆ ≥ ∆¯. In summary, for ∆ ≥ ∆¯ the entrepreneur is financed by the strategic
investor (and exerts effort e∗∗), while for ∆ ∈ (∆, ∆¯) she is financed by an independent investor.
18To see this, notice that adding up the entrepreneur’s and the strategic investor’s participation constraints
reduces to e(Π +∆)− ψ(e) ≥ eFB(0)(Π +∆)− ψ(eFB(0)). This holds if and only if e ≥ eFB(0) (see fn. 8).
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